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RIGHT1, RIGHT2, RIGHT3, RIGHT4,
AND HOW ABOUT RIGHT?
LAYMAN E. ALLEN

INTRODUCTION
Careful communication is frequently of central importance in law.
The language used to communicate even with oneself in private
thought profoundly influences the quality of that effort; but when
one attempts to transmit an idea to another, language assumes even
greater significance because of the possibilities for enormously dis
torting the idea. Word-skill is to be prized. Few have expressed this
more aptly or succinctly than Wesley N. Hohfeld:l
... [I] n any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non
legal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought
and to lucid expression.
Such a proposition should not be controversial among lawyers and
legal scholars. In any event, the starting assumption of this article is
that careful communication is sometimes useful. To facilitate such
communication where it is deemed desirable, the discussion that fol
lows is aimed at helping to clarify one of the fundamental concepts
in legal discourse - namely, the concept of right. This task will be
approached in the spirit in which Felix S. Cohen explored such
ideas2 - uot asking,
What does the term 'right' really mean?
but rather,
How is it most useful to define it?
Certainly, it is still worth while to do what we can to make less
haunting the chilling, more-than-half-century-old reminder of John
Chipman Gray:a
... The student of Jurisprudence is at times troubled by the
thought that he is dealing not with things, but with words, that
he is busy with the shape and size of counters in a game of
logomachy, but when he fully realizes how these words have
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been passed and are still being passed as m oney, not only by
fools and on fools, but by and on some of the acutest m inds, he
feels that there is work worthy of being done, if only it can be
done worthily.
DISTINGUISHING VARIOUS SENSES OF 'RIGHT'
In his classic effort to help clarify legal discourse by specifying for
it a set of "lowest common denominators," Hohfeld indicates prior
judicial recognition that the term 'right' is used indiscriminately and
ambiguously to denote a wide variety of legal relations. 4 Som etimes
'right' is used to indicate a privilege to do something.On other occa
sions its reference is to a power to create some legal relationship. Still
other times it is used to show that someone has immunity from hav
ing his legal status changed in some way.M ostly, however, it is used
to refer to right in the strict sense of somebody else's obligation to do
something for the right-holder.5 For each of these four different
senses of 'right', Hohfeld stipulated a different term :
Right1 right (in strict sense)
Right2 privilege
Right3 power
Right4 immunity
Right1 The definite and appropriate meanin g that Hohfeld stipu
lated 'right' (in the strict sense of a legally enforceable claim) should
refer to is the correlative of 'duty'.He gave as example:G
•

...[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the for
mer's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a
duty toward X to stay off the place.
Hohfeld, in effect, thus specified 'right' to refer to a three-term rela
tionship between two persons and an action-the right-holder, the
other party, and an act of the other party.To say that x has a (legal)
right that p shall be done by y is the same as to say that it is obliga
tory that p be done by y for x, and that the legal system will enforce
the obligation.
Consider a statement like 'The ball is red'. This statement attri
butes the property red (R) to the ball (b). An abbreviated way of
writing it is 'Rb'.Just as 'Rb' is an abbreviated way of writing 'The
ball is red', so too is '(Rpy)x', or more briefly, 'Rpyx' an abbreviated
way of writing 'x has a right that p be done by y'.
Right2• Hohfeld emphasiz ed the importance of distinguishing the
concept of privilege from the concept of right, and he reserved the

108

Alle n

term 'privilege' to refer to what one person was permitted to do as
far as some other person was concerned. Continuing the prior exam
ple, he states:'

. . . [W] hereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man,
should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering
on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to
stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to
stay off.
So, 'privilege' also is also, in effect, specified by Hohfeld to refer to a
three-term relationship between two persons and an action - the
privilege-holder, the other party, and an act of the privilege-holder.
To say that x has a (legal) privilege to do p as far as y is concerned is
the same as to say that it i s permissible for p to be done as far as y is
concerned by x and that the legal system will not enforce any at
tempt through litigation by y to prevent x from doing p.
Right3• For Hohfeld 'power' is most usefully reserved to refer to
the change in legal relations that results from some "superadded fact
or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or
more human beings." The person (or persons) whose volitional con
trol is paramount has the (legal) power to effect the particular
change of legal relations. He gave the following example of terminat
ings a legal relation:9

.... X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible
object" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest
(rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of oper
ative facts known as abandonment; and - simultaneously and
correlatively - to create in other persons privileges and powers
relating to the abandoned object, - e.g., the power to acquire
title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power
to transfer his interest to Y,
that is, to extinguish his own
interest and concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding
interest.
-

Hence, Hohfeld's treatment of 'power' is significantly different from
the treatment of 'right' and 'privilege'. The latter pair of terms refer
to three-term relationships, while 'power' is, in effect, stipulated to
refer to a two-term relationship between (a) the changing of a legal
relation and (b) the power-holder. To say that x has the (legal) power
to create legal relation r is the same as to say that legal relation r is
not so now, that it is within the volitional control of x to do p, and
that if x does p then legal relation r will be created.
Right4• Hohfeld saw parallels between the right-privilege relation
ship and t.Pe power-immunity relationship. In his words:
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...A right is one's affirmative claim against another, and a pri
vilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Sim
ilarly, a power is one's affirmative "control" over a given legal
relation as against another; whereas an immunity is one's free
dom from the legal power of "control" of another as regards
some legal relation .. . . X, a landowner, has, as we have seen,
power to alienate to Y or to any other ordinary party. On the
other hand, X has also various immunities as against Y, and all
other ordinary parties. For Y is under a disability (i.e., has no
power) so far as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to
a third party is concerned; and what is true of Y applies similar
ly to every one else who h� not by virtue of special operative
facts acquired a power to alienate X's property.

Like the treatment of 'power', the term 'immunity' is, in effect,
treated as referring to a two-term relationship between (a) the chang
ing of a legal relation and (b) the disability-holder (the person who
does not have power to change that legal relation). To Hohfeld, to
say that x has an immunity from y's control with respect to creating
legal relation r would be to say (a) that legal relation r is not so now
and (b) that although it may be within the volitional control of y to
do p, it is not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r will
be created. If the concepts of power and immunity were going to be
treated in detail here (they are not), it would be useful to amend this
slightly by saying that to say that legal relation r has an immt1nity
from y's control would be to say that (a) legal relation r is not so
now and (b) that although it may be within the volitional control of
y to do p, it is not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r
will be created.
The remarks above about Rights0 ,2 ,3 ,& 4 > are slight elaborations
on what Hohfeld actually said about 'right', 'privilege', 'power', and
'immunity', but they are only clarifications that facilitate transition
to the discussion of a formally defined concept of right to be pur
sued here and are not in any way inconsistent to Hohfeld's ideas. It is
the idea of right (in the strict sense), indicated by Hohfeld by the
term 'right' and indicated here by the term 'Right1' , that attention
shall be focused on. Some considerations involved in formally defin
ing the concept of right will be explored, and a preliminary proposal
for defining it will be undertaken. The relationship of the proposed
defined concept of right to proposed defined concepts of privilege,
duty, and noright will be considered, and some of the relationships
of right to proposals that will be made in the future for defining
power, immunity, liability, and disability will be briefly sketched.
Hohfeld's monumental contribution in clarifying the language
available for discussing law was the precursor of legal realism.aa The
magnitude of his influence is revealed in the efforts of his disciples Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur L. Corbin, and Karl Llewellyn - who
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were among the leading lights of realism in law . Further refinement
along the lines that Hohfeld charted may well pave the way for an
other major breakthrough in legal thought and practice by signifi
cantly enhancing the compatibility of law and computers and the
usefulness of the latter to the former in the emerging electronic age.
It is to this purpose that these preliminary efforts toward formalizing
the Hohfeldian system of legal analysis are addressed .
Before turning to the formal definition of right, there is a preli
minary matter to be considered. It would be useful to have a clear
and unambiguous way of indicating the occurrence of a defined
term. A commonly-used method in legal writing is to capitalize the
first letter of the defined term . Hence, by stipulation a Defined term
(like this one, i.e., the word 'Defined') is a word whose initial letter is
capitalized. This works fine most - but not all - of the time. Defin
ed terms may appear as the first words of a sentence. Then it is not
clear whether the word is
a) being used in its Defined sense and therefore being capital
ized for being both the initial word of a sentence and occur
rence of a word used in a Defined sense, or
b) being used in a sense other than its Defined sense and there
fore being capitalized only because it is the first word of a
sentence.
An alternative method for indicating a DefineD term is to capitalize
both the first and last letters of the term . DefineD terms used in
their DefineD sense would then be distinguished from those same
terms used in a sense other than their DefineD sense. This is the
method that will be used for indicating occurrences of DefineD terms
in this article. Thus, 'RighT' will indicate an occurrence of a De
fineD term.

Formal Definition of 'RighT'9b
In approaching the task of formally defining the term 'Right', re
call that to say (in a Hohfeldian sense) that x has a (legal) right that p
shall be done by y is the same as to say that it is obligatory that p be
done by y for x and that the legal system will enforce the obligation.
The statement 'x has a right that p shall be done by y' can be abbre
viated by the expression 'Right-pyx'. Hereafter, such abbreviations
will be indicated by statements such as the following:

(1)

RighT-pyx

=ab x has a right that p shall be done by y.

The '=ab' indicates that the statement on its right is equal (by
abbreviation) to the statement on its left.
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Note that t o say that it i s obligatory that p b e done by y for x and
that the legal system will enforce the obligation is the same as to say
that it is (legally) obligatory that p be done by y for x. The various
parts of the statement 'it is (legally) obligatory that p be done by y
for x' can be abbreviated as follows:
(2)

0

=ab it is (legally) obligatory that

(3)

D2py

=ab p is done by y

(4)

D4px

=ab p is done for x

(5)

D24pyx

=ab p is done by y for x.

Using these abbreviations the formal contextual definition of 'RighT'
is as follows:

(6)

RighT-pyx

=df OD24pyx.

It may be helpful in reading an expression like 'RighT-pyx' to con
sider its similarity to another statement that cont.a.ins a three-term
relation. Consider the three-term relation indicated by the term 'Be
tweeN' in a statement like 'Philadelphia is between Boston and Wash
ington'. The statement can be abbreviated as follows:

(7)

BetweeN-bwp

=ab Philadelphia is between Boston and
Washington.

This abbreviation indicates that 'BetweeN' is a three-term relation
that relates the terms 'b', 'w', and 'p' just as 'RighT' is a three-term
relation that relates the terms 'p', 'y', and 'x'. Another way of look
ing at 'BetweeN-bwp' is to regard 'BetweeN-bw' as a property (or
predicate or one-term relation) of p so that 'BetweeN-bwp' is re
garded as saying that Philadelphia (p) has the property (BetweeN-bw)
of being between Baltimore and Washington. Similarly, instead of re
garding 'RighT' as a three-term relation in 'RighT-pyx', we could just
as well look at 'RighT-py' as a property of x so that 'RighT-pyx'
would be interpreted as saying that x has the property (RighT-py) of
having a right that p be done by y. Hence, just as:

(8) Rb =ab

The ball has the property of being round
(which is another way of saying that the ball
is round).

is used in standard logical notation to indicate the property (round�
ness) is predicated of the object (the ball), so also:

(9) RighT-pyx =ab x has the property of having a RighT-py.
This may be helpful in appreciating the rationale underlying the
(seemingly) peculiar order of the symbols in 'RighT-pyx' in which
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the right-holder, x, appears last even though in the statement 'x has a
right that p be done by y• x appears first.
Since 'RighT' in (6) is defined in terms of')' and 'D24', we shall
have a formal definition of 'RighT' only when 'O' and 'D24' have
been formally defined. First we whall consider the formal definition
of 'O', which is used to indicate the concept of legal obligation. We
shall, in the manner of Alan R. Anderson,10 treat •o• as a unary
operator operating on a proposition (the idea expressed by a sen
tence), rather than as operating on a class (of acts) in the manner of
Georg von Wright.11
There are certain properties that any adequate definition of legal
obligation should have. The six properties that will be considered
here are not in any sense thought to be a comprehensive list. They
happen to be six that distinguish among various formal systems that
have been formuJated by logicians as pomble candidates to be used
for defining the concept of obligation. The concept of legal obligation
that is defined in a formal syst.em should (I believe, at this time) be
such that it has the following six properties:

(Pl)

It is not provable in the formal system that from 'it is
(legally) obligatory that p", it is valid to infer "it is (legal
ly) obligatory that it is (legally) obligatory that p•.

Using '--o' to indicate non-provability, (Pl) can be abbreviated as
follows:

(P2)

Op-o
Op --0

OOp.
Lop.

(It is not provable in the formal system that from 'it is
(legally) obligatory that p', it is valid to infer 'it is logi
rally necessary (L) that it is (legally) obligat.ory that p".)

(P3)

--o

0 (if p, then p) .

(It is not provable in the formal syst.em that logical
tautologies (such as, 'if p, then p ') are (legally ) obliga
tory.)

(P4)

OPp.
p -o
(It is not provable in the formal sysrem that from 'p", it
is valid to infer 'it is (legally) obligatory that it is (legal
ly) permitted that p• (where 'P' indicates legal pennis
sion and 'Pp" is defined as 'not obligatory not p').)

(P5)

It is provable in the formal system that 'it is (legally)
obligatory that if it is (legally) obligatory that p, then p
is true'. (In other words, legal obligations (legally) ought
to be fulfilled.)
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Using '-**' to indicate provability,

(P5)

can

be abbreviated as

follows:

0 (if Op, then p).

-**
(P6)

Op,

0

(if p, then q) -**

Oq.

It is provable in the formal system that from 'it is obli
gatory that p' and 'it is (legally) obligatory that

if p, then

q', it is valid to infer 'it is (legally) obligatory that q'.
For the first four properties, it is evident and easy to illustrate that
any reasonable formal definition of the concept of legal obligation
should result in the non-provability statements
of

(Pl),
(10)

(Pl)-(P4). If

instead

Op -** OOp, then from a statement such as:
It is obligatory in Michigan now that persons with earn
ings of

$10,000

file a state income tax statement.

it would be possible to prove as a matter of logic:

(11)

it is obligatory that

Certainly, just because

(10)

(10).

happens to be true, we would not want

the concept of legal obligation so defined that as a matter of logic it
is provable that

(11)

is true-in effect, that it is (legally) obligatory

that Michigan have a state income tax. Although it is certainly true

that it is (legally) permitted that Michigan have a state income tax, it

is just as true that it is also (legally) permitted that Michigan not have
a state income tax. In fact, in
in

1968 it did-and

1960

it did not have such a tax, while

both were (legally) permitted. Furthermore,

if the

Michigan legislature wishes to terminate this tax, it certainly has the
legal power to do so. Hence, just because

(10) happens to

be true, we

would not want to deime the concept of legal obligation in such a .
way that it is, therefore, legally obligatory for (10) to be true.

(P2 ) , rather than OP-** LOP, is similar.
(10) happens to be true, we would not want to so define

The argument in favor of
Just because

the concept of legal obligation that it can be logically proved that

(12)

It is logically necessary that

(10).

If it were necessary as a matter of logic that (10) be true, then it
would be, in effect, logically impossible for Michigan not to have a
state income tax. That is clearly absurd. As a matter of fact, until

very recently Michigan has not had such a tax.
To argue the concept of legal obligation should be so defined that
-**
for

0

(if

(if p, then p), rather than

(P3),

is the same as asserting that

p, then p) not to be so is a violation of the law. There is not a

single statute, constitutional provision, regulation, or other (legal)
normative command that (to my knowledge) so provides. If tautolo
gies were universally obligatory (legally) as a matter of logic, then
there certainly should be more indications of it in (legal) normative
commands. As a matter of fact, it would seem to be the extreme of
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redundancy for legislatures to spend their time commanding that
logical truths be so. If a proposition about the state of affairs is, in
fact, logically true, then it would be impossible for it to be other
wise. Such an obligation would be one that would be impossible to
violate. And what kind of obligation would that be! Certainly it
would not be one that would likely have much effect upon human
behavior, if that is what legal norms are intended to do. It seems
clearly more desirable to so define the concept of legal obligation
that (P3) is the case, that is, so that it is not (logically) provable that
tautologies are (legally) obligatory.
Finally, with respect to the fourth non-provable statement invol
ving the concept of legal obligation - namely, (P4) - it would be
strange beyond belief for obligation (of any kind, legal included) to
be defined otherwise. To contend that p-** OPp is to contend that
it is against the law for anything that is, in fact, done to be forbidden
by the law. This would forbid the legislature (as a matter of logic)
from commanding or prohibiting any kind of human behavior. To
deny (P4) would just be too bizarre to consider seriously.
The final pair of properties that should be among the minimum
prerequisites of any adequate definition of legal obligation involve
statements of provability about statements involving legal obligation.
Unlike the first four, these cannot be justified by merely giving coun
ter-examples. To argue for (P5) is to contend that as a matter of logic
it should be provable that there is a violation of the law if it is not so
that if Op then p. Notice that this contention is quite different from
saying that if Op then p. The latter is saying that everything that is
obligatory is, in fact, done. Alternatively, to say that if Op then p is
to say that there are no violations of law. That is clearly not so, and
nobody would seriously so contend. All that 'O(if Op, then p)'
asserts i'> that '(if Op, then p)' should, as a matter of law, be so; it
does not assert that it is, in f act, so. Another way of putting it would
be to say that the concept of legal. obligation should be so defined
that if there is no violation of the legal command that legal norms
should be fulfilled, then the legal norms, in fact, have been fulfilled.
It would be strange to define legal obligation so that this would be
otherwise. To do so would be to accept the possibility that there
could be a violation of some legal obligation, but this violation would
not be a violation of an obligation that legal obligations be fulfilled.
Finally, to argue for 'Op, O(if p, then q) ---o Oq', rather than (P6)
is to maintain that it should be logically possible for there to be an
obligation that p and an o bligation that if p then q, and despite this
pair of obligations, for 'q' not to be so without violating the legal
system. That this is (logically) unreasonable is apparent from a con
sideration of the two possible situations: (a) p and not q, and (b) not
p and not q. These are the only possible situations where 'q' is not
so, and both clearly lead to a violation. In situation (a), it must be
the case that 'not (if p then q)', because 'not q' follows from 'p' and
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'if p then q'. Therefore, the second obligation would be violated, and
hence, there would be a violation of one of the norms of the legal
system, namely, 'O(if p then q)'. In situation (b), the first obligation,
namely, 'Op', is violated, and hence, there is a violation of one of the
norms of the legal system. Since in all cases, 'not q' leads to a viola
tion of the legal system, by definition, it is obligatory that q.
By means of these six criteria we shall be able to distinguish from
eight different formal systems of logic the one that leads to the most
adequate definition of legal obligation in the sense that it has all six
properties. But before considering the first formal system, we should
examine in closer detail what is meant by the expression 'it is (legal
ly) obligatory that'. It can be contextually defined as follows:
(13)

Op

=df

If not p, then there is a violation.

Thus, in some of the systems that will be considered here, 'It is obli
gatory thaT' is defined in terms of 'if-then', 'not', and 'violation',
which in turn will be defined in the formal system. The concept of
violation is defined in terms of the particular individual violations of
particular legal norms of the legal system.
(14)

V

=ab

There is a violation.

It will be the concept that links the formal system realistically to the
legal system. Operationally in real-world experience when there is a
particular individual violation, if the matter is appropriately brought
to the attention of the authorized community decision makers, they
will bring the resources of the community to bear in pressuring the
violator. It should also be noted that 'V', in indicating a violation in
the sense of a violation of the legal system of norms, rather than the
violation of a particular norm, is exactly like Anderson's 'S' (disjunc
tion of all sanctions); 'V' is the disjunction of all particular violations
(V1, V2 , ... Vn).

Logical System LSJ

The first logical system to be considered as a possible candidate
for use in defining 'O' is the ordinary two-valued propositional logic,
here called LSl. LSl is formulated in the subordinate-proof style of
Frederic Fitch12 and in the parenthesis-free notation of Jan Lukasie
wicz,13 as are the other seven systems to be considered. The 'if-then'
formalized in LSl is material implication and is represented by the
connective 'C'. Negation is represented by the connective 'N'. Using
these, 'It is obligatory thaT' (hereafter abbreviated 'ObligatioN') is
defined in the following contextual definition:
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(15)

Ow

=elf

CNwV.

('It is obligatory thaT w' is equal to by definition 'If not
w, then there is a violation'.)
LSl can be formulated by the following alphabet, formation rules,
transformation rules, and definitions:
Alphabet

Variables

p qr

Connectives

CKN

S

s 5 s6 ...

Meta-Variables
Formulas
WFFs
(well-formed
formulas)

UVWW4

w5

•

•

•

Formation Rules

FRl

If a formula is a variable, then it is a WFF.

FR2

If formulas e and f are WFFs, then
(a) so are Kef and Cef, and
(b) , so is Nf.

FR3

If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the
above rules, then it is not a WFF.

Transformation Rules
Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

TRl

Ko:
Kvw - * v, w.
(From the K-WFF 'Kvw', it is assumed to be valid
to infer the WFF 'v' and to be valid to infer the
WFF 'w'.

TR2

v, w -* Kvw.
(From 'v', 'w', it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Kvw'.)
Cvw, v -* w.
Co:
(From 'Cvw' and 'v', it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'w'.)

TR3

TR4

Ki:

(v -** w) -* Cvw.
Ci:
(From the provability, in a subordinate proof, of
'w', given that 'v' is assumed to be true, it is assum
ed to be valid to infer 'Cvw'. In the statement of

Right

117

the Ci Rule, the parentheses are used to indicate a
subordinate proof. In the vertical style used by
Fitch, this would be written:

Cvw
TR5

w -* (v: ... w).
R:
(From 'w', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w' in a
subordinate proof in which 'v' is a supposition.)

TR6

No:
(Nv -** w, Nw) -* v.
(From the provability in a subordinate proof of 'w'
and 'Nw', given that 'Nv' is assumed to be true, it
is assumed to be valid to infer 'v'.)

Definitions

Dl

Ad:
Avw =df NKvNw.
('v or w' is equal to by definition 'it is not so that
(not v and not w)'.)

D2

Ed:
Evw =df KCvwCwv.
('v is equivalent to w' is equal to by definition 'if
v then w, and if w then v'.)

In LSl so formulated, it is provable that 'C-NCNpV-V' can be
inferred from 'CNpV'. Since 'Ow' is 'CNwV', the following is the
case: Op-** OOp. Hence, (Pl) is not fulfilled in LSl. Similarly, it
c a n be shown that in LSl (P3) is not fulfilled (because -**
C-NCpp-V, and hence, -** OCpp) and also that (P4) is not fulfilled
(because p -** C-C-NCNNpV-V, and hence, p-**OPp). This leads
to the conclusion that '0' as defined is not adequately formalized in
LSl because the definition of 'O' in this system does have the first,
third, and fourth properties that an adequate definition of legal obli
gation should, as a minimum, have. The concept of obligation de
fined in LSl would, however, be adequate with respect to (P2), (P5),
and (P6).
Logical System LS2

The efforts by logicians to formalize more adequately the concept
of 'if-then' have led to consideration of the systems of logic, some
times referred to as "modal" logic (or more precisely as "alethic"
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logic). Here we shall consider the possibilities of defining '0' in two
of the standard systems of alethic logic - the one called System M
and the one called System S4. The 'if-then' concept of Systems M
and S4 is usually called "strict" or "logically necessary" implication
in contrast to the "material" implication of LSl. In these two sys
tems, the concept of "logical necessity" is here indicated by the
symbol 'L'. The expression 'LCpq' will be read as 'p necessarily
implies q' and will represent a different sense of 'if p then q' than is
represented by 'Cpq' in LSl.
In System M, it is possible to prove everything that is provable in
LSl; in addition, some further theorems can be proved. When two
systems are related in this way, the system in which more theorems
are provable is called an "extension" of the other system. Hence, M
is an extension of LSl. There is a sense in which LSl is included in M
and a sense in which M can be built upon the set of assumptions that
constitute the formulation of LSl. Here M will be formulated as
those assumptions (alphabet, formation rules, transformation rules,
and definitions) of LSl plus some additional ones. The additional
ones are as follows:
Alphabet

Constants
Connectives
Formation Rules

FRl

If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a
WFF.

FR2

(c) so is Lf.

Transformation Rules
Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

TR7

Lo:
Lw -* w.
(From 'w is true necessarily as a matter of logic' it
is assumed to be valid to infer 'w'.)

TR8

L ( )oLi:
L( ...w) -* Lw.
(From an L-restricted subordinate proof that has
'w' as an item, it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Lw'.)
For purposes of LS2, an L-restricted subordinate
proof is one that only L-WFFs can be reiterated in
to. Reiteration in to L-restricted subordinate proofs
is done by means of TR9, which is similar to the R
rule of LSl.Both are referred to as reiteration rules
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-TR5 for reiterating into unrestricted subordinate
proofs and TR9 for reiterating into L-restricted
subordinate proofs.
TR9

LoL( )i:
Lw -* L(v: . . . w), L( .. . w).
( From 'Lw', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w' in
an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 'v' is a
supposition, and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'w' in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which
there are no suppositions.)

Definitions

D3

Md:
Mw =df NLNw.
('It is possible that w' is equal to by definition 'it is
not so that it is logically necessary that not w'.)

System LS2 is an extension of M obtained by adding the following
axiom and definitions to M:
Al

MNV
MNVa:
( It is logically possible that there is no violation.)

D4

Vd:

V =df AA. . .AV1 V2
_,,_
'n

.

•

•

V n+l ·

('V' is equal to by definition the disjunction of all
the violations of a legal system that there can be,
that is, if 'V' is true then there is at least one viola
tion of the legal system.)
D5

Od:
Ow =df LC-Nw-V.
('Ow' is equal to by definition 'LC-Nw-V', which
when interpreted is: 'it is obligatory that w' is equal
to 'if not w, then there is a violation'.)

D6

Pd:
Pw =df NONw.
('Pw' is equal to by definition 'NONw', which when
interpreted is: 'it is permitted that w' is equal to
'it is not obligatory that not w'.)

In LS2 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascertained
that the following is the case:

(16)

-** OLCpp.

(17)

---o

OLC-Op-p.

Hence, neither (P3) nor (P 5 ) is fulfilled in LS2, and thus '0' is not
adequately formalized in this system.
Logical System LS3

System S4 is a system of alethic logic that is an extension of M. It
::an be formulated by merely replacing TR9 of M by the following
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slightly stronger rule for reiterating into L-restricted subordinate
proofs:

TRlO

Lw -* L (v: ...L W), L (.. .Lw).
LoL(L)i:
(From 'Lw' it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Lw'
in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 'v' is
a supposition, and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Lw' in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which
there are no suppositions.)

LS3 is an extension of S4, and it is also an extension of LS2. LS3
can be obtained by adding axiom Al and definitions D4, D 5 , and D6
to S4; or alternatively, it can be obtained by replacing TR9 in LS2
by TRlO. In LS3 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascer
tained that not only are ( 16) and (17) the case but also the following:

(18)

Op -** OOp.

(19)

Op -** LOp.

Hence, not only (P3) and (P5) but also (Pl) and (P2) fail to be ful-"
filled in LS3, and thus 'O' is not adequately formalized in this system
either.
Logical System LS4

Frederic Fitch has formulated a system that is an extension of
84.14 Instead of defining 'O' in terms of 'LC' and ' V' (as in LS2 and

LS3), he introduces 'O' by means of the following four transforma
tion rules:

TRll

Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

O( )oOi:

0( ... w) - * Ow.

(From an 0-restricted subordinate proof that has
'w' as an item, it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Ow'.)

TR12

O (Ow -* w).
O(Oo):
(Within an 0-restricted subordinate proof, from
'Ow' it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w'.)

TR13

OoOo:
(From ' Ov'

Ov, ONv -* w.
and 'ONv', it is assumed to be valid to

infer 'w'.)

TR14

Ow·-* O(v: ... Ow), 0( .
Ow).
to infer 'Ow'

OoO(O)i:

.

.

(From 'Ow', it is assumed to be valid

in an 0 re stri c te d subordinate proof in which 'v' is
a s u p p os ition and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Ow' in an 0-restricted subordinate proof in which
there are no suppositions.)
-

,

Right

1 21

The result when these four rules are added to 84 is System F(S4)
(here called LS4). So formulated, LS4 is just like LS3 with respect to
the six properties being considered here of an adequate definition of
legal obligation, except that (P2) is fulfilled for LS4 while it is not
for LS3.
Logical System LS5

When these four obligation transfomation rules (TR11-TR14) are
added to System M, the resulting system if System F(M) (here called
LS5) . LS5 is exactly like LS2 with respect to the six properties being
considered : neither (P3) nor (P5) is fulfilled, but the other four are.
Clearly , in the five systems considered so far, the troublesome pro
perties are (P3) and (P5). In none of the five systems is (P3) fulfilled,
and (P5) is fulfilled only in LSL Next to be examined is a system
that comes to grips with (P3), the most pervasive difficulty .
Logical System LS6
An approach to formulating logical systems developed by Ander
son in collaboration with Nuel D. Belnapt 5 has led to the desired
result with respect to (P3). In one of Anderson's systems there is
specified a formalization of 'if-then' that more closely approximates
its meaning in English prose, i.e., that the consequent somehow logic
ally follows from and is dependent upon the antecedent. In System
EIG when it is asserted that the following is true :

(20)

if p then q
(that is, 'p entails q', or in notation 'Tpq')

two conditions are required to be fulfilled that, for example, need
not necessarily be fulfilled with respect to 'Cpq' of LSl :
( 2 1)

the truth of 'q' follows from the truth o f 'p',

(22)

the truth of 'q' is dependent upon the truth of 'p'.

and
What these two requirements of relevance and dependence preclude
are the provability in E of such things as 'T-p-Trr' and 'T-p-Tpr',
whereas in LSl 'C-p-Crr' and 'C-p-Crp' are provable. With respect to
'T-p-Trr', (22) is not fulfilled because the truth of 'Trr' is not depen
dent upon the truth of 'p'. On the other hand, with respect to 'T-p
Trp' ( 2 1) is not fulfilled because if 'Trp' follows from the truth of
'p', then when 'p' is true so is "I'rp'. This, in turn , means that when
'p' is true the two requirements must be fulfilled for the 'r' and 'p' of
'Trp' for 'Trp' to be true. But when 'p' is true for empirical reasons,
for example, the truth of 'p' in 'Trp' does not follow from the truth
of 'r' (leaving (2 1) not fulfilled) , and it is not dependent upon the
truth of 'r' (leaving (22) not fulfilled) . Hence, (21) is not always ful
filled for 'T-p-Trp'.
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If the 'LC' of LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5 is interpreted as entailment,
the restrictions upon reiteration into L-restricted subordinate proofs
constrain the systems so that 'LC-p-LCqp' is not provable; therefore,
requirement (21) is fulfilled. However, (22) is not fulfilled in these
systems, because 'LC- p-LCrr' is provable. Anderson builds (22) into
LS6 by specifying a subscripting notation for keeping track of all the
suppositions actually used in deducing and restricting the entailment
in rule-Le., T( )oTi-so that only if supposition 'w' is used in deduc
ing 'v', will it be valid to infer that 'Twv' follows from a proof of 'v',
given 'w' 11 Requirement ( 21) is built into LS6 the same way that it
is in LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5-by restrictions upon reiteration into
restricted subordinate proofs.
The set of assumptions for formulating a logical system is called
the "basis" of that system. The basis of System Eis as follows:
.

Alphabet

Variables
Sentence

p q r s s5 s6

•

•

.

Numerical Subscripts
Individual

[i]

Set

ab

Logical Sum

aUb

Logical Difference

a-b

Constants
Connectives
Meta-Variables
e f fa f4 . . .

Formulas
WFFs

Formation Rules

FRl

If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a
WFF.

FR2

If formulas e and f are WFFs, then

(a)

so are Kef, Tef, and Aef, and

(b)

so are fa and Nf.
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If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the

above rules, then it is not a WFF.

Transformation Rules
Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

Ko':

Kvwa-* Va, wa.
where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscripts on 'Kvw' that
is carried along to 'v' and 'w'.

(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'va' and to be valid to infer 'wa'.)
Ki':

va, wa -* Kvwa.
where 'a' indicates that the set of
numerical subscripts on 'v' and
'w' must be identical and that the
same set of subscripts is carried
along to 'Kvw'.

(From 'v a' and 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to in
fer 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w').)
To:

Tvwa , v b-* WaUb·
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the
sets of numerical subscripts on
'Tvw' and 'v' may be different
and 'aUb' indicates that the set
of subscripts carried along to 'w'
is the logical sum of 'a' and 'b'.

(From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails w') and 'v b', it is as
sumed to be valid to infer 'wau b'.)
T(v [i] -** wa) -* Tvwa�[i] .
T ( )oTi:
where '[i]' indicates a numerical
subscript assigned to supposition
'v' which is distinct from the nu
merical subscript assigned to any
other supposition, 'a' is a set of
subscripts which contains '[i]',
and 'a-[i]' is a set of subscripts
comprised of those in 'a' with
'[i]' deleted.
(From the provability, in a T-restricted subordinate
proof, of 'wa', given that 'v [ il' is assumed to be
true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Tvwa-[i]'
(i.e., 'v entails w').)

Allen

124
ToT(T)i:

Tuva * T(w[i]: . . . Tuva),
T( . .. Tuva>·
where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscripts on 'Tuv' that is
carried along upon reiteration
into a T-restricted subordinate
proof and '[i]' indicates a numer
ical subscript assigned to supposi
tion 'w' which is distinct from
the numerical subscript assigned
to any other supposition.
-

(From 'Tuva' (i.e., 'u entails v'), it is assumed to be
valid in a T-restricted subordinate proof to infer
'Tuva'• given that 'w[i]' is assumed to be true, and
it is assumed to be vahd in a T-restricted subordin
ate proof to infer 'Tuv a'.)
wa - * Wa·
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'wa'.)

Rp':

Avwa -* NKNvNwa.
(From 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'NKNvNwa' (i.e., 'not (not v and not
w)'.)

AoNKi':

NKoAi':
(From 'NKNvNw a' (i.e., 'not (not v and now w)'),
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Avwa ' (i.e.1 'v or
w').)
KuAvwa -* AKuvwa .
(From 'KuAvwa' (i.e., �u and (v or w)'), it is assum
ed to be valid to infer 'AKuvwa' (i.e., '(u and v) or
w').)

KoAi2':

ToNo:

Tvwa, Nwb -* NvaUb·
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the
sets of numerican subscripts on
'Tvw' and 'Nw' may be different
and 'aUb' indicates that the set of
subscripts carried along to 'Nv' is
the logical sum of 'a' and 'b'.

(From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails w') and 'Nwb' (i.e.,
'not w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Nvaub'
(i.e., 'not v').)
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T(v[i] -** wa, Nwb) -*Nvaub-[i].

T()oNi:

where 'a' and 'b' indicate that
the sets of numerical subscripts
on 'w' and 'Nw' may be differ
ent, '[i]' indicates a numerical
subscript assigned to supposition
'v' which is distinct from the nu
merical subscript assigned to any
other supposition and is contain
e d i n both ' a ' a nd 'b', and
'aUb-[i]' indicates that the set of
subscripts carried along to 'Nv' is
<;:omprised of those in 'aUb' with
'[i]' deleted.
(From the provability in a T-restricted subordinate
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'v [il' is assum
ed to be true, it is assumed to be vafid to infer
'Nvaub [i]' )
-

.

NNi':

wa -* NNwa.
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer
'NNwa' (i.e., 'not with w').)

NNo':

NNwa-*wa.
(From 'NNwa ' (i.e., 'not not w'), it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'wa'.)

The following tabulated summary of a proof of the transitivity of
'T' (entailment) illustrates a proof in System E.
ToToTi

Tpq1,

Tqr2

-**

Tpr12

1

Tpq1

s

2

Tqr2

s

3

Ta

s
l,ToT(T)i

c

Tpq1
q13

d

Tqr2

2,ToT(T)i

e

ri23

d.c,To

b

4

Pa

Tpr12

b,a,To

3,T()oTi

Several things about the proof of ToToTi should be noted:
(a) Each supposition is assigned a unique numerical subscript
(items 1, 2, and 3a).
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(b) When 'q' is inferred from 'Tpq' and 'p' as item 3c, their sub
scripts, 1 and 3, respectively, are carried along to 'q'. Similar
ly, for item 3e.
(c) When 'Tpr' is inferred as item 4 from the proof of 'r', given 'p'
as a supposition, the 3-subscript of 'p' is contained in the
1 23-subscript of 'r', and the 1 2-subscript of 'Tpr' is the result
of deleting 3 from 123.
A typographically more convenient as well as more perspicuous sum
mary tabulation for checking purposes results if subscripts are eleva
ted to the line-level of the WFF and listed in a column between the
proof and its justification, as in the following tabulation of a proof:

-

1

** T-TpTqr-TKpqr

Ta
b

c
2

TpTqr

1

s

Tl

Kpq

2

s

2

TpTqr

1

a,ToT(T)i

3

p

2

1 ,Ko

4

Tqr

12

2,3,To

5

q

2

1 ,Ko

6

r

12

4 ,5,To

1

b,T( )oTi

TKpqr

T-TpTqr-TKpqr

l,T( )oTi

The 'if-then' (represented by 'T') formalized in System E thus for
mulated permits formalization of a concept of legal obligation that
does fulfill (P3). The following set of transformation rules, axioms,
and definitions, along with those for E, form the basis for LS6, with
in which '0' is defined.
L( . . . wa ) -* Lwa.
( From an L-restricted subordinate proof that has
'wa' as an item that is not a supposition, it is as
sumed to be valid to infer 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically
necessary that w'). )

L( )oLi' :

LoL(L)i' :

Lwa -* L(v[i] : . . . Lwa ), L( . . .
Lwa>·
where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscripts on ' Lw' that is
carried along upon reiteration in
to an L-restricted subordinate
proof and '[i] ' indicates a nu-
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merical subscript assigned to sup
p o s i t i o n ' v' which is distinct
from the numerical subscript as
signed to any other supposition.
{From 'Lwa ' {i.e., 'it is logically necessary that w'),
it is assumed to be valid in an L-restricted subor
dinate proof to infer 'Lwa '. given that 'v [i]' is as
sumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid in
an L-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa '.)
Lwa -* wa.
(From 'Lwa ' (i.e., 'it is logically necessary that w'),
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Lwa'.)

Lo':

Axioms

MNVa:

MNV.

(It is logically possible that there is no violation . )
Definitions

V =df AA . . . AV 1V2 . . . Vn+l·
'--..-'
n
('There is a violation' is equal to by definition
'there is a violation of particular legal norm #1
or there is a violation of particular legal norm #2,
. . ., or there is a violation of particular legal norm
# (n+l)', where there are just n+l norms in the
legal system.
Mw =df NLNw.
Md:

Vd:

{'It is logically possible that w' is equal to by defi
nition 'it is not so that it is logically necessary that
not w'.)
Od:

Ow =df TNwV.

('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition
'not w entails there is a violation'.)
Pd:

Pw =df NONw.

('It is permitted that w' is equal to by definition 'it
is not so that it is obligatory that not w'.)
The concept of if-then formalized by 'T' in LS6, when used to
relate the forbidden act to the violation in the definition of legal ob
ligation, leads to the following:
(23)

-o

OTpp.
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This means that

(P3)

is fulfilled for the 'O' of LS6. Unhappily, how

ever, the following are also the case:

(24)

Op

LOp.

(25)

-o OTOpp.

-* *

These mean that

(P2)

and

( P5)

are not fulfilled in LS6. Happily,

however, both of these can be remedied if 'O' is defined in terms of a
still different concept of if-then, which is explored in the next logical
system to be considered here.

Logical System LS7
The entailment concept o f if-then formalized in LS6 requires both
relevance and dependence. In 187 there is introduced a weak impli

cation ('W') concept of if-then, which has the same relevance require
ment as entailment, but a slightly weaker dependence requirement. If
legal obligation is defined in terms of a weak implication relation be
tween the forbidden state o f affairs and the violation, the non-fulfill
ment of

(P2)

and

(P5)

are remedied, but another problem results.

The basis for LS7 can

be obtained by making the following

changes in LS6:

1.

Replace the 'T' in the alphabet by 'W'.

2.

Replace the 'Tef' in FR2 by 'Wef'.

3.

Replace the transformat i o n rules:
To, T()oTi, ToT(T)i, ToNo, and T()oNi

by the transformation rules:
Wo, W()oWi, W()i, WoNo, and W()oNI
shown below.
Wo:
(From 'Wvwa' (i.e., 'v weakly implies w') and

it is assumed to be valid to infer 'waub'.)
W( )oWi:

W (v[i] -** wa)
where [i] is in a.

-*

'vb' ,

Wvwa-[i]

(From the provability, in a W-restricted subordin
ate proof, of 'wa ', given that 'v i]' is assumed to be
[
true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Wvwa-[i]'
(i.e., 'v weakly implies w').)

W( )i:

wa -* W(v[i]: ... wa), W( ...
wa).

(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid in a W-restrict
ed subordinate proof to infer 'wa ', given that 'v i '
[ ]
is assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be vahd
in a W-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'wa'.)
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WoNo
( From 'Wvwa' (i.e., 'v weakly implies w') and
'Nwb', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Nv aub'·
W( )oNi:
W ( v [ i ] -* * w a , N wb ) - *
Nvaub-[i]
where [i] is in both a and b.
(From the provability in a W-restricted subordinate
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'Nv ril' is as
sumed to be true, it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Nvaub-[i]'.)
4. Replace Od by the Od shown below.
Od:

Ow =df WNwV

('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition
'not w weakly implies there is a violation'.)
The relationship between entailment ('T' of LS6) and weak impli
cation ('W' of LS7) can be made more evident by adding the follow
ing definition to LS7:
Td:

Tvw =df LWvw.

('v entails w' is equal to by definition 'it is logically
necessary (in the 84 sense) that v weakly implies
w'.)
The entailment concept of LS7, thus defined, is exactly the same
concept of if-then as the entailment concept of LS6. It is of some
interest that 'W' is related to 'T' in the way that 'C' is related to 'LC'
(of 84):
Tvwa-** Wvw.
LCvw -* * Cvw.

L( . . . Wvwa)-** Tvwa.
L( . . . Cvw) -** LCvw.

In LS7 the concept of legal obligation leads to the following
happy results:
(26)
Op -o LOp,
(27)

-** OWOpp.

Therefore, (P2) and (P5) are fulfilled. However,
(28)

p -** OPp.

This means that (P4) is not fulfilled. It is, however, the only one of
the six requisite properties that the legal obligation concept of LS7
fails to have. In LS8 that last flaw is eliminated.
Logical System LSB

In each of the seven systems considered so far as possible candi
dates for use in defining the concept of obligation there has been at
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least one flaw in terms of the six criteria being used to evaluate the
adequacy of proposed definitions of obligation. This is summarized
in Table 1 below where the asterisks ( *) indicate the u nsatisfactory
properties of the definition of obligation in each of the seven sys
tems.
Table 1
LS1

LS2

LS3

LS4

*

*

*

Pl

LS5

P3

*

P4

*

*

*

*
*

*

P5

*

LS7

*

*

P2

LS6

*

*

*

*

P6
*= definition of obligation is
unsatisfactory in this respect
One system that satisfactorily fulfills the six criteria being used
possesses all the complexity of LS7-and then some more. This sys
tem, LS8, defines obligation in terms of still another concept of if
then, namely what here shall be called 'natural implication'. Natural
implication, in turn, is defined in terms of natural necessity and gen
uine implication, while n atural necessity is defined in term s of the
laws of nature and genuine imp lication. Genuine implication is a vari
an t of if-then that is slightly weaker than weak implication. It is like
weak implication in every respect except that double negation intro
duction holds for some but not all of the expressions in the system
that defines genuine implication.
The basis of Logical System LS8 is as follows:
Alphabet

Variables
Sentences

p q r s s5 s5 . . .

Numerical Subscrip�
Individual

[i]

Set

ab

Logical Sum

a Ub

Logical Difference

a-b

Constan�
Connectives

Z V1 V2 V3 . . .
K G A N B R L M

1 31

Right
Meta-Variables

e f f3 f4 . . .

WFFs

u v w w4 w5

Formation Rules

FRl

If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a
WFF.

FR2

If formulas e and f are WFFs, then

(a)

so are Kef, Gef, and Aef, and

so are f a, Bf, Rf, Lf, Mf, and Nf.
If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the
above rules, then it is not a WFF.
(b)

FR3

Transformation Rules
Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

Ko':

Kvwa -* va, wa .
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'va' and it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'wa'.)

Ki':

va, wa -* Kvwa.
where 'a' indicates that the set of
numerical subscripts on 'v' and
'w' must be identical and that
the same set of subscripts is car
ried along to 'Kvw'.

(From 'va' and 'wa '. it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w').)
Go':

Gvwa, vb -* WaUb·
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that
the se ts of numerical subscripts
on 'Gvw' and 'v' may be differ
ent and 'aUb' in dicates that the
se t of subscripts carried along to
'w' is the logical sum of 'a' an d
'b'.

(From 'Gvwa' (i.e., 'v genuinely implies w') and
'v b', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'wa u b ' . )
G(v[i] -* * wa ) -* Gvw a-[i].
G ( )oGi':
where '[i]' indicates a numerical
subscript assigned to supposition
'v' which is distinct from the nu-
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merical subscript assigned to any
other supposition, 'a' is a set of
subscripts which contains '[i] ',
and 'a-[i]' is a set of subscripts
comprised of those in 'a' with
'[i] ' deleted.
(From · th e provability, in a G-restricted subordin
ate proof, of 'wa'. given that 'v n ]' is assum ed to be
true, it is assumed to be valicf to infer 'Gvwa-[i]'
(i.e., 'v genuinely implies w').)
G( )i':

wa -* G (v[i]: . . . wa ), G( . . .
wa >·

where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscripts on 'w' that is
carried along on reiteration into
a G-restricted subordinate proof
and '[i]' indicates a numerical
subscript assigned to supposition
'v' which is distinct from the nu
merical subscript assigned to any
other supposition.
(From ' wa'. it is assumed to be valid in a G-restrict
ed subordinate proof to infer 'wa'• given that 'v[i) '
is assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid
in a G-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'wa'.)
GoNo':

Gvwa, Nwb - * NvaUb·
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that
the sets of numerical subscripts
on 'Gvw' and 'Nw' may be differ
ent and 'aUb' indicates that the
set of subscripts carried along to
'Nv' is the logical sum of 'a' and
'b'.

(From 'Gvwa' (i.e., 'v genuinely implies w') and
'Nw' (i. e., 'not w'), it is assumed to be valid to in
fer 'Nva ub' (i.e., 'not v').)
G()oNi':

G ( v [ i ] - ** W a , N w b ) - *
Nvaub-[i].

where 'a' and 'b' indicate that
the sets of numerical subscripts
on 'w' and 'Nw' m ay be differ
ent, '[i]' indicates a numerical
subscript assigned to supposition
'v' which is distinct from the nu-
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merical subscript assigned to any
other supposition and is contain
ed i n both ' a ' and 'b', and
'aUb-[i]' indicates that the set of
subscrip ts carried along to 'Nv' is
comprised of those in 'aUb' with
'[i]' deleted.
(From the provability in a G-restricted subordinate
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'Nv r i l' is as
sumed to be true, it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Nva ub-[i]'.)
Rp':

The same as in LS6.

AoNK.i':

The same as in LS6.

NKoAi':

The same as in LS6.

KoAi2':

The same as in LS6.

NNo':

The same as in LS6.

Lo':

The same as in LS6.

L( )oLi':

The same as in LS6.

Ai':

(From
'Avwa'
'Awva'

W a -* Avwa, Awva,
'wa '. it is assumed to be valid to infer
(i.e., 'v or w') and to be valid to infer
(i. e. , 'w or v').)

KoNNK.i':

Kvwa -* NNKvwa
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'NNKvwa ' (i.e., 'not not v-and-w').)

LoR(L)i':

Lw a - * R(v [ i]: . . . Lwa),
R( . . . Lwa)
where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscrip ts on 'Lw' that is
carr ied along upon reiteration in
to an R-restricted subordinate
proof and '[i]' indicates a nu
merical subscript assigned to sup
p os i t i o n 'v' which is distinct
from the numerical subscript as
signed to any other supposition.

(From 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically necessary that w'),
it is assumed to be valid in an R-restricted subor
dinate p roof to infer 'Lwa '. given that 'v[i]' is as
sumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid in
an R-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa'. )
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LoLNNi':
(From ' Lwa' (i.e ., 'it is logically necessary that w'),
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'LNNwa' (i.e ., 'it
is logically necessary that not w').)
MoNLNi':
(From 'Mwa' (i.e . , 'it is logically possible that w'),
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'NLNwa' (i.e., 'it
is not logically necessary that not w') .)
NLNoMi' :
(From ' NLNwa ' (i.e., 'it is not logically necessary
that not w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Mwa ' (i .e ., 'it is logically possible that w').)
GZwa-* NBNwa .
(From 'GZwa' (i.e., 'the laws of nature1 s genuine
ly imply that w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer
'NBNwa ' (i.e., 'it is not naturally necessary that
not w' ) - )

GoNBNi':

MIG':
(From ' wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer
'MKZwa ' (i.e., 'it is logically possible for both the
laws of nature and w to be true').)
MKZwa-* NGZNwa .
(From 'MKZwa ' (i.e., 'it is logically possible for
both the laws of nature and w to be true'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'NGZNwa ' (i.e., 'it is
not so that the laws of nature genuinely imply that
not w' ) . )

MKoNGi ' :

RoGi':
(From 'Rwa' (i.e . , 'it is naturally necessary that
w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'GZwa ' (i.e.,
'the laws of nature genuinely imply that w').)
GZwa-* Rwa .
(From 'GZwa ' (i.e., 'the laws of nature genuinely
imply that w') , it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Rwa ' ( i .e., 'it is naturally necessary that w').)

GoRi':

R( )oRi' :

R( . . . wa )-*Rwa ·

(From an R-restricted subordinate proof that has
'wa ' as an item that is not a supposition , it is as
sumed to be valid to infer 'Rwa ' (i.e ., 'it is natural
ly necessary that w').)
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Rw a - * R ( v [ i ] : . . . Rwa ) ,
R ( . . . Rwa ) ·
where 'a' indicates the set of nu
merical subscripts on 'Rw' that is
carried along upon reiteration in
to an R-restricted subordinate
proof and ' [i] ' indicates a nu
merical subscript assigned to sup
p o s i t i o n ' v' which is distinct
from the numerical subscript as
signed to any other supposition.

(From 'Rwa ' (i.e., 'it is naturally necessary that
w '), it is assumed to be valid in an R-restricted sub
ordinate proof to infer 'Rwa '. given that 'v nJ ' is
assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be vahd in
an R-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Rwa'.)
BoMKi':

Bwa -* MKZwa .
(From 'Bwa' (i.e ., 'it is naturally possible that w'),
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it
is logically possible that both the laws of nature
and w are true').)

MKoBi':

MKZwa -* Bwa .
( From 'MKZwa ' (i.e., 'it is logically possible that
both the laws of nature and w are true'), it is as
sumed to be valid to infer 'Bwa' (i.e. , 'it is natural
ly possible that w').)

Axioms

MNVa:

MNV.

(It is logically possible that there is no violation.)
Za:

Z.

(The laws o f nature are true.)
Definitions

Vd:

The same as in LS6.

Id:

Ivw =df RGvw.

('v naturally implies w' is equal to by definition 'it
is naturally necessary that v genuinely implies w'.)
Od :

Ow =df INwV.
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('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition
'not w naturally implies that there is a violation'.)
Pd:

The same as in LS6.

The relationships between the logical concepts and natural con
cepts considered with respect to which can and cannot be inferred
from each other as formulated in LSS are summarized in Figure 1 .
Figure 1

Lwa * *-** NMNwa
0

*
Rwa *

* GZwa **

-

--

* NBNwa * *

* * Ilwwwa

-

0

*
*
w
a
0 0\

*

\

*

\

\

\

*
Bwa *-* MKZwa * *-* NGZwa **

* * NRNwa

-

0

*
*

Mwa *

-

* NLNwa

where -* *

=

-o

-*

=

provability of validity
non-provability of validity
assumption of validity
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= logical necessity
= negation
= logical possibility
= natural necessity
= natural possibility
= genuine implication
Z = laws of nature
I = natural implication
K = conjunction

L
N
M
R
B
G

·

The following are also the case in LSS:
p -o OOp

Op

-o

LOp

-o Olpp
P -o OPp

-** OIOpp
Op, Olpq -* * Oq
Hence, all six of the criteria being used to test the adequacy of a
definition of the concept of obligation are met by 'O' as defined in
LSS. With the complex task of adequately defining obligation now
taken care of, there is just one more brief matter to be considered
before turning to the formal definition of RighT-namely, what it
means for something to "be done", to "be done by someone", and
to "be done for someone".

Done, Done By, and Done For
To say that something has been done is an abbreviated way of
making a statement of fact that it is true that a given state of affairs
is the case Similarly, to say that something has been done by person
x is an abbreviated way of stating that responsibility for the fact that
a given state of affairs happens to be the case is ascribed to person x
by virtue of some articulated (or unarticulated) policies. So, too, is
saying that something has been done for x an abbreviated way of
stating that x is a person on whose behalf a given state of affairs is
the case according to some articulated (or unarticulated) policies. Be
cause the formal definition of RighT involves such concepts, it will
be necessary to add to LSS provisions for including these "doing"
id,eas.
.
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Transformation Rules
Name of Rule

Statement of Rule

DoloDi':

(From 'Dva ' (i.e., 'v has been done') and 'lvwv '
(i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Dwa Ub ' (i.e., 'Dw has been done').)
D2vxa' lvwb -* D2wa Ub ·
(From 'D2vxa' (i.e., 'v has been done by x') and
'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'D2WJtam' (i.e., 'w has been
done by x').)
D4VXa' Ivwt> -* D4WXa Ub ·
D4oID4i' :

D2oloD2i':

(From 'D4na' (i.e., 'v has been done for x') and
'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'D4WXa Ub' (i.e., 'w has been
done for x').)
D2oDi':
D2wxa -* Dwa .
(From 'D2wxa' (i.e., 'w has been done for x'), it is

assumed to be valid to infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w has been
done').)

D4oDi':
( From 'D4wa' (i.e., 'w bas been done for x'), it is

assumed to be valid to infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w bas been

done').)

OD2WXa. DNwb -* D2NWXa Ub ·
(From •on2WXa' (i.e., 'it is obligatory that w be
done by x') and 'DNwb' (i.e., 'not w has been
do n e ' ) , it is assumed to be valid to infer
•n2NWXam' (i.e., 'not w bas been done by x').)

OD2oDNoD2Ni':

OD4oDNoD4Ni':

0D4WXa, DNwb -* D4NWJeaUb·
(From 'OD4mta• (i.e., 'it is obligatory that w be
done for x') and 'DNwb' (i.e., 'not w has been
don e " ) , it is assumed to be valid to infer
'D4N-wxam/ (i.e., 'not w hai beei1I done for x').)

D2NoND2i':

D2NWXa -* ND2wxa.

(From 'D2NWXa' (i.e., 'not w has been done by x'),

it is assumed to be valid to infer 'ND2wXa,' (i.e., 'it
is not so that w has been done by x').)
D4NoND4i':

D4NWXa, --* ND4WXa

(From 'D4NWXa,' (i.e., 'not w has been done for
x'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'ND4w:xa'
(i.e., 'it is not so that w has been done for x').)
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Definitions

D24d:

D24wxy =df K-D2wx-D4wy

('w has been done by x for y' is equal to by defini
tion 'w has been done by x and w has been done
for y'.)
D42d:

D42wxy =df K-D4wx-D2wy

('w has been done for x to y' is equal to by defini
tion 'w has been done for x and w has been done
by y'.)
RighTd:

RighT-wxy =df OD24wxy

('y has a right that w with respect to x' is equal to
by definition 'it is obligatory that w be done by x
for y'.)
DutYd :

DutY-wxy =df OD42wxy

('y has a duty to w with respect to x' is equal to by
definition 'it is obligatory that w be done for x by
y'.)
NorighTd:

NorighT-wxy =df NOD24wxy

('y has a noright that w with respect to x ' is equal
to by definition 'it is not obligatory that w be done
by x with respect to y '.)
PrivilegEd:

PrivilegE-wxy =df NOND42wxy

('y has a privilege to w with respect to x' is equal
to by definition 'it is not obligatory that it not be
so that w is done for x by y'.)
These definitions of RighT, DutY, NorighT, and PrivilegE lead to
the relationships specified by Hohfeld as summarized in Figure 2 .
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Figure 2

It is obligatory that
w be done by x for y .

It is obligatory that
w be done for y by x.

(OD24wxy)

(OD42wyx)

RighT-wxy

* *·----------* *

DutY-wyx

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

N-NorighT-wxy

**--------- * *

N-PrivilegE-Nwyx

(NNOD24wxy )

(NNOD42wyx)

It is not the case that
it is not obligatory that
w be done by x for y.

It is not the case that
it is not obligatory that
w be done by y for x .

Further exploration into the Hohfeldian system to formalize the
concepts of Conditional righT and PoweR is beyond the scope of this
article. Formalization of these two concepts and other associated
with them requires introduction of functional calculus, as well as the
concept of time. This will be treated in a subsequent article.
CONCLUSION
The first part of Hohfeld's system of analysis-namely the part
that deals with Rights. DutieS, NorightS, and PrivilegeS-is formal
ized in the preceding pages after detailed consideration of the prob
lems involved in defining ObligatioN, which in tum is used in defin
ing RighT and the other three Hohfeldian concepts . Six criteria are
proposed for testing the adequacy of any definition of ObligatioN,
and it is shown that the difficulties of most definitions of 'O' are
linked with how if-then is formalized in the various logical systems
considered. Certainly, one may wish to add to these criteria and fur
ther refine the concept of ObligatioN, or one may opt for a different
outcome with respect to the six properties explored. The important
point is not that a complete and final stipulation of ObligatioN (and
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the other concepts that depend upon it) shall be definitively achieved
in this article, but rather that the p10cess of carefully arriving at such
definitions be illustrated. To the extent that other efforts are similar
ly careful, the research endeavors and analyses of legal scholars can
become more cumulative. We would do well to profit -from the ex
perience of the natural sciences in this respect and ever recall that . . .
a dwarf sitting on the shoulders of a giant
can see farther than the giant.
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